英语翻译Our work is related to several strands of the corporate governance literature.As mentioned,JBBF (2000) find that countries with stronger legal protection for minority shareholders experienced less severe exchange rate depreciation and sto

英语翻译Our work is related to several strands of the corporate governance literature.As mentioned,JBBF (2000) find that countries with stronger legal protection for minority shareholders experienced less severe exchange rate depreciation and sto
英语翻译
Our work is related to several strands of the corporate governance literature.As mentioned,JBBF (2000) find that countries with stronger legal protection for minority shareholders experienced less severe exchange rate depreciation and stock market declines during the crisis than countries with weaker legal protection.These authors focus primarily on differences in the legal systems and strength of legal enforcement across different countries,although their intuition and model is motivated at the firm level.We focus primarily on differences in ownership structure at the firm level,while controlling for the legal regime of the country and other factor.In a similar vein,Mitton(2000)studies five East Asian countries at the firm level and finds evidence that firms with greater disclosure performed better than other firms during the crisis period .In contrast to our findings,however,he finds little evidence that the separation of cash flow and control rights affects firm performance during the crisis period.Claessens,Djankov,and Klapper (1999)find that East Asian controlled by management/family group were less likely to file for bankruptcy during the crisis.They argue that this insurance against bankruptcy may come at the expense of minority shareholders.Finally,Rajan and Zindales (1998) argue that,despite inadequate protection ex ante,the use of arm’ length capital (i.e.a market-based and contractual framework) in East Asia worked fine before the crisis,but could not provide safeguards against expropriation during the crisis,leading to minority investors rationally exiting the market.
Consistent with this hypothesis ,we find that Tobin’s Q rations of those firms in which minority shareholders are potentially most subject to expropriation decline twelve percent more than Q rations in other firms during the crisis period.A similar result holds for stock returns-firms in which minority shareholders are most likely to experience expropriation underperform other firms by about nine percent per year during the crisis period.These results are robust to controls for country and industry effects as well as proxies for differences in risk across firms and the strength of the country’s legal institutions.Also consistent with our predictions,we find no differences in annual changes in firm performance between firms with and without cash flow rights leverage prior to the crisis.Overall,we find strong support for the view that management’s ‘leverage’ of cash flow ownership into greater effective control of the firm enhances the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders during the crisis period.

英语翻译Our work is related to several strands of the corporate governance literature.As mentioned,JBBF (2000) find that countries with stronger legal protection for minority shareholders experienced less severe exchange rate depreciation and sto
自己翻译的,有些东西不明白,参考一下吧.打“”号的是真的不明白怎么回事.
我们的工作关系到几缕企业管理文学.正如我们提到的那样,JBBF（2000）发现,对于小股东有更强法律保护的国家在经济危机中经受的汇率下跌和股市跌盘比那些对小股东法律保护较少的国家要少.尽管他们的直觉和模型都来自于企业层面,这些作者首先关注的是国家之间法律系统和执法力度上的差别.我们首要注重的是在企业层面上的所有权结构,而管理会计更关注国家的法律管理体系和其他因素.Mitton(2000)用同样的方式在企业层面上研究了东亚五个国家得出的证据表明,拥有更强财务披露制度的公司在经济危机中要比其他共司表现得好.可是和我们的调查结果相反的是,他没有发现证据证明资金和管理权的分划影响到了企业在经济危机中的表现.Claessens,Djankov,和Klapper (1999)发现由管理团队和家庭组织控制的东亚（公司）在经济危机中不大可能会申请破产.他们认为这些反对破产行为的保障可能在于牺牲小股东.最后,Rajan 和 Zindales (1998)认为,尽管前瞻性保护措施不充分,可在东亚“手臂长度资本”（比如,以市场为基础的契约结构）的使用在经济危机之前很有效.但这种做法在经济危机中不能提供对剥夺的防范,所以导致小股东投资者理性的退出了市场.
与这些假设一致的是,我们发现这些小股东遭受剥夺的公司的Tobin’s Q值（企业的市场价值与资本重置成本之比）在经济危机中比其他公司下降了12%.同样的情况也适用于那些小股东在经济危机中受剥夺的股票收益公司,他们股票的运作在经济危机中每年都比其他公司低9%.“这些结果对于国家和工业影响的控制,和对公司与国家法律体系在风险中不同的代理都是强有力的.”同样也和我们的预测相吻合的是,无论在经济危机之前有没有资金流权利杠杆,公司每年表现的变化都没有差别.总的来说,我们为我们的观点（公司更有效地控制资金流管理杠杆在经济危机中增加了剥夺小股东的诱因）找到了强有力的证据.

我们的工作关系到几股的企业治理文学。如前所述,JBBF(2000)发现的国家,有较强的法律保护少数股东有经验的不那么严重的汇率贬值和股票市场下跌危机期间,比国家法律保护较弱。这些作者主要集中注意力于不同的法律制度和法律的强制力量跨越不同的国家,虽然他们的直觉和模型的动力在该公司的水平。我们主要集中注意力于所有权结构上的差异,而在该公司控制水平的国家的法律制度和其他因素。在相同的面纱,在五(2000...

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我们的工作关系到几股的企业治理文学。如前所述,JBBF(2000)发现的国家,有较强的法律保护少数股东有经验的不那么严重的汇率贬值和股票市场下跌危机期间,比国家法律保护较弱。这些作者主要集中注意力于不同的法律制度和法律的强制力量跨越不同的国家,虽然他们的直觉和模型的动力在该公司的水平。我们主要集中注意力于所有权结构上的差异,而在该公司控制水平的国家的法律制度和其他因素。在相同的面纱,在五(2000)研究东亚国家在该公司发现证据水平和更大的披露公司,业绩优于其它企业在危机时期。在我们的研究结果的对比,然而,他发现没有足够的证据表明这些分离的现金流和控制权影响公司业绩在危机期间的时期。Claessens,Djankov,Klapper(1999)发现东亚控制管理/科群是很少可能申请破产危机期间。他们认为,本保险对破产可能会在少数股东的费用。最后,拉詹和Zindales(1998)认为,尽管事前保障不足,使用手臂的长度(即资本市场化和契约框架)在东亚工作罚款之前了危机,但无法提供保护措施,制止征收在这场危机中,导致中小投资者合理退出市场。
符合这一假说,我们发现托宾的Q的口粮那些公司少数股东们可能最受征地下降12%多问口粮在另一个公司在危机时期。持有存货了一个类似的结果returns-firms少数股东最有可能被征收其它公司将就经验,每年大约有百分之九危机期间的时期。这些结果具有很强的鲁棒性,控制效果为国家和行业以及代表在企业风险的不同和实力的国家的立法机构。也符合我们的预测,我们看不出年度变化差异与公司业绩的企业之间的权利和无现金流量的杠杆作用在危机发生之前。总的来说,我们发现强烈支持的观点,那就是管理的“杠杆”进更大的现金流所有权进行有效的控制,提高了激励充公公司小股东在危机期间的时期。

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